The Uncounted Costs

B..Baskar and R. Suresh

 

The article `The Meaning of Pokharan II’ which appeared in the Financial Express a day after India conducted the nuclear tests extended unequivocal support to the tests. In fact the stand taken by its author R. Jagannathan is very similar to that of the front-page editorial which appeared in Indian Express, referred to in the earlier piece by J. Sri Raman.

The article starts out by congratulating the Government for having the ``…guts to do what is right for itself’’. The article also calls the timing of the tests ``…noteworthy because over the last few weeks the Government has been the target of a sustained pressure campaign by political opposition and a pusillanimous intelligentsia to abandon its nuclear power forever’’. Now we all know who these pusillanimous intellectuals are.

Nuclear weapons are also supposed to be cheaper the conventional armoury! The article debunks the economic arguments against the nuclear bomb in an almost offhanded manner, by very casually stating that ``…resources for development cannot be obtained by sacrificing security unless one wants to repeat 1962’’. And this in a country where almost 40 per cent of the population still lives under abject poverty. The now familiar language of the cold war politics and deterrence is also used to buttress support for the tests. In fact the language used in this article would have made that high- priest of deterrence Prof. Henry Kissinger proud.

The routine comparisons with China are made, about how successful it was in building a nuclear arsenal and how that was used to its economic advantage in the global economic sphere. The comparisons with China make little sense as even 20 years ago, when it first started opening up its economy cautiously, its economic position was far superior to that of India. The arguments used in this article may sound familiar as they are popular with at least a section of vocal middle-class. The reason why these tests are hailed as a major scientific achievement is largely due to the gigantic inferiority complex which the English speaking middle-class Indian suffers, not only vis-a-vis its Western counterparts but also its Chinese counterparts. China’s experience with nuclear bombs keep cropping up as its experience in playing the zero-sum game of international diplomacy is largely seen as a successful one compared to the ``hypocrisy’’ of Nehruvian non-alignment.

The article `A Test of Nerves’ which appeared on May 14, after the second round of tests, largely focusses on how India should brace up to the economic consequences of the tests. ``Some international commentators and domestic cry-babies have already warned us that there will be an economic price to pay for the nuclear tests, but this price is worth paying in the short and medium running view of the country’s long-term objectives in conducting the tests in the first place’’ – this statement just about sums up the stand take by its author. A routine references to China is again made ``… One objective is to force the international community to treat India as a responsible nuclear state, on a par with *China.’’

On how India should tackle the impact of sanctions, ``… the answer is boldly and with cunning’’. A greater push on the liberalisation front as a bait for foreign investors to nullify the impact of sanctions is suggested. The jury on whether the reforms started in 1991 has made any real impact on poor is still out. But the fact that even with ``impressive’’ results, liberalisation can leave a sizeable section of the population untouched is something which even the Fund Bank consensus acknowledges. But, for the author of this article, there is almost a reflexive connection between more reforms and more public welfare. Now comes the ``cunning’’ part and easily the most dangerous part.

To quote: ``… there is the option of subtle blackmail: India must tell the world in no uncertain terms that just because it has abstained from exporting nuclear or missile technology in the past, it cannot be assumed that it will continue to be so restrained in future’’. Now, if having nuclear weapons was not bad enough, we are also supposed to ``threaten’’ the West with ``subtle blackmail’’ of exporting it to other ``rogue nations’’.

In an effort to counter the loud chest-thumping and mutual back-slapping between the Government and scientists, the article which appeared on May 13, `Pokharan II: What the recoil could mean’ by R. Venkata Subramanian goes about puncturing some the myths paraded by the Government as certainties.

It questions the geopolitical assumptions made by the Government for conducting the tests. To quote: ``It’s unlikely that the explosions will not leave a ripple effect in the geo-political axis around the country, and in the event shift the balance, perhaps forever. For one, Delhi’s image as a `bully’ in the region will be reinforced. Did the country need to answer Pakistan’s test-firing of Ghauri missile? And if had to, was this the best way of doing it?’’

The author alludes to the danger of Pakistan retaliating with a similar test at Chagai Hills, and retaliate it did. But even if it had not retaliated, China would step up its conventional arms exports to Pakistan and Pakistan will surely ``.. stoke insurgency in the much battered Kashmir valley in the form of `political and moral support’ to separatists’’. The author is also convinced that India will not be able to bear the impact of the sanctions as the economy is already in doldrums. The article ends with a quotation form Roman warrior Pyrrhus: ``One more victory like this, and we are undone.’’

The response of the Economic Times (reports from issues dated May 12 to May 15, 1998) to the Pokharan nuclear blasts by India can be largely divided into two categories: relating to (1) security implications and (2) economic implications.

In contrast to The Financial Express, The Economic Times has taken a sober view of the nuclear tests. Though its objections did not stem out of any pacifist position and were based mainly on realpolitik considerations such as security and the impact on the economy, it did not indulge in any jingoistic muscle-flexing.

Dealing with security implications, the paper has largely questioned the wisdom of the Government in going in for the nuclear tests. It holds that India had an edge over Pakistan in the conventional arms race and the nuclear tests negated whatever strengths India had over Pakistan. However, the reports are ambiguous on whether they support a conventional arms build-up. An article titled `Economically dangerous delusions of grandeur by Swaminathan Aiyar: May 12) says that rhetoric on deterrence is hollow, it only leads to mutually-assured destruction. The BJP is using the ``language of attack, not deterrence’’. Nuclear bombs do not offer security, ``they merely ensure self-devastation’’…. ``this ability to raze Pakistani cities five times over does not improve India’s position over its ability to raze Lahore alone. In any event, Pakistan can raze any Indian city, so war should be unthinkable.’’

Aiyar adds: ``Creating deterrence capacity is cheap and affordable. Fissile nuclear material for possible 80 small bombs has already been created and these can be assembled at short notice. But if we wish to get into a major nuclear war capacity, that is a totally a new ball game, demanding budgets that even superpowers find difficult to manage.’’ It is clear from the language used by the author that India has to maintain its superiority over Pakistan which he feels is neutralised by the nuclear tests.

The argument used here is not an unequivocal abandonment of nuclear weapons. It almost seems to say that unless you are a superpower economically you have no business conducting nuclear tests.

This point is reiterated in the editorial `Strategically irrelevant’ (May 15), which talks of how the conventional superiority of India has been neutralised (as Pakistan also has the wherewithal and technology to conduct N-tests, and conduct it did). The claim made by scientists and military men that these tests enhance security is hollow, it says. The editorial adds: ``In conventional war 40 tanks can win against 30 tanks. But in N-war, 40 bombs cannot beat 30, that merely ensures mutual reduction to radioactive rubble. If Delhi, Mumbai, and Jaipur are destroyed, it will be no consolation that Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad will be destroyed five times over.’’

The editorial `How to beat the sanctions’ (May 13) says: ``The triple explosions does not, in our view, improve the security of India significantly. The 1974 tests already gave India a credible deterrent and the 1998 blasts do little more to confirm that. Lots of jingoistic Indians are delighted that India has established N-biceps, but actually the news is 24 years old. What is new is bicep-flexing will now attract economic penalties.’’

It advocates signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to contain the damage of sanctions, etc. Though the support for signing the CTBT is for containing the damage caused by sanctions, this argument also comes dangerously close to the one advocated by the people in power, for whom signing of the CTBT is conditional on viewing India as a mature nuclear-weapons state.

The editorial of May 14 `Damage control’ says: ``In for a penny, in for a pound, in for a few kilotonnes more. Irrespective of the desirability of the three N-tests conducted by India on Monday, having conducted them, it made sense to carry out any further tests needed to complete the series thereafter…. By conducting another set of tests, the Govt has signalled that it refuses to be cowed down by the threat of sanctions by foreign powers.’’ The editorial says the Government has to now focus on minimising damage. And work on ways to lifting sanctions using the divergent global opinions on the US-led sanctions.

In an editorial-page article on May 15, `Closing an economic option’, Narendar Pani says: "In a unipolar world with the increasing marginalisation of the NAM movement, India could have stepped under the nuclear umbrella of the US and focussed its energy on the economy. This would have been a sufficient and credible deterrent against Pakistan and China. The examples of post-war Japan and Germany are quoted. The author is not unduly concerned that this would have only been achieved at a considerable loss of sovereignty on the part of India and that whatever autonomy India had under the ``hypocritical’’ Nehruvian worldview and NAM would have been eroded significantly.

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The stories on the economic implications of Pokharan II make interesting reading. One set of stories reflects the view that the tests have led India to the brink of disaster and that sanctions and withdrawal of loans by multilateral lending agencies will cause a huge damage to the economy. It also fears that the reforms process will slow down as a result of this. The other view is that the impact of sanctions will be minimal and India can absorb the shocks. This viewpoint highlights the fact that, given the nature of India’s market, it will be very difficult for the Western countries to sustain sanctions, as they will be the net losers. Interestingly, all the leading chambers of commerce share this viewpoint.

In his article of May 12 previously referred to, Aiyar also highlights the economic costs that have to be paid by India for conducting the tests. He says that the economic risks are high and that this will have an adverse impact on the already volatile rupee. His views on the tests and the sanctions are as follows: (a) India could have deployed nuclear weapons without testing and suffered no economic sanctions. (b) This would have enabled the BJP to reap domestic political capital without incurring serious foreign costs. (c) Pakistan may not retaliate and leave India isolated in facing the sanctions. (Of course, this did not happen). (d) US investments, technology transfers, bank credits from multilateral agencies may get hit. Other foreign investments are under threat, aid from other donors are also under threat.

The article of May 13, `US may find imposing sanctions difficult’ says the same thing. India is too big a market to be ignored by the US. It says India is pinning faith on the US business lobby (which may be the net loser) to reverse sanctions. A report headlined `WTO meet likely to be rough riding for India’ says developed countries will put pressure on India to open up the services sector to foreign investments, scrapping of quantitative restrictions, etc. Under the headline `Impact of sanctions will be limited, says industry’, another report says that leading chambers of industry and commerce such as the FICCI, ASSOCHAM, and the CII played down the impact of sanctions. Most in fact supported the blasts. They held the view that, since the sanctions would be at the inter-governmental level, private capital flows will not be affected. It will be interesting to know what the `Bombay lobby’, which has been crying foul over the entry of MNCs and demanding a level playing field, has to say on the blasts.

Since there is a broad, favourable consensus on the efficacy of economic reforms among the mainstream papers, the reason why the nuclear tests disturbs these people is that it may derail the reforms process. As the reforms critically hinge on the inflow of foreign capital, whether in the form of direct investments or the inflow of ``hot money’’, the tests are seen as ``deterrent’’ to further investment flows.

The symbolism of reforms seems to be overwhelmingly in favour of the entry of MNCs in the consumer goods sector, and the entry of prominent international brand names -- be it Levis jeans, Ray Ban sunglasses or MacDonald’s – has hogged disproportionate newsprint, largely biased towards the 150-200-million-strong middle class aspiring for Western standards of living. The support of at least a section of this middle class for weapons has its logic, therefore, as a further extension of superpower aspirations.