What happened on May 11, 1998, was more than a series of Indian nuclear blasts in a desert test range. Pokharan was a package. It was an explosion with a range of extra-radioactive fallouts: political, economic, and socio-cultural. Consequently, every response to the event, too, was an integrated whole. No exception was the media response.

Especially the media response that sought to convey a message. The response that, by its approval or disapproval of the tests, sought to mould public opinion. There is little need for any but the ludicrously over-academic to ascertain who won the media vote: the ayes loudly and clearly outnumbered the nays. It would be more interesting and instructive to see how exactly the response performed its role, how the media helped manage or manipulate opinion in favour of Pokharan and all that it stood for. To bring out the method behind the media-Pokharan that has been blasting away since that mid-summer news-break.

Particularly would it be so to examine such a response from within the elite section of the English-language press, or what are known as national newspapers, in this regard. And, for two reasons. In the first place, these newspapers continue to hold a pre-eminent place among the media, including the electronic, as opinion-setters. Directly or derivatively, they wield considerable influence over not only the public opinion but also opinion-makers, and not only opinion-makers but policy-makers as well.

Secondly, they do it with a significant difference. Their pro-Bomb response was free from the crudities of the fellow-campaigners in the plebian sections of the print media. It illustrated a new strategy to market an old, even stale message.

Its was not the unabashed jingoism of the majoritarian kind. It, actually, took pains to take an ostensibly anti-jingoist stance. It did not greet the blasts, for example, with screaming headlines of `Jai Shri Ram’, once a pious chant and now a communal war-cry heard in hundreds of streets in the wake of the tests. It even went out of its way to warn against such expressions of euphoria. It spoke to, and for, those who shared the sentiment but shied away from the slogans.

It spoke to, and for, a broadened constituency of a conglomerate of political forces associated with the idea of an Indian, if not a Hindu, bomb. Especially the recent addition to the following, the section that tried to see the original base as the lunatic fringe of a larger camp. The urban segment, particularly from the new generation, of an ultra-nationalist camp.

The audience made for a particular pro-Bomb argument. For a package to answer the package that was Pokharan. The argument began by claiming legitimacy for the tests and what they entailed. And, it went on to question not just the logic but the legitimacy of any opposition to them.

It claimed legitimacy for Pokharan and the policy it announced by claiming a national consensus in its favour. It did so despite known facts to the contrary: the coalition in power had not sought and secured a vote on the issue; there was no post-Pokharan verdict of a consensual kind, either electoral or parliamentary, on the question; the blasts only implemented an item on the National Agenda of Governance of post-election adoption by the coalition partners. There, certainly, had been no national debate on the subject.

At the same time, however, the argument claimed also that the blasts were a departure from the past. The claim was that courage had been found at last to act upon a consensus that was already and always there. Pokharan was projected as a symbol of a brave new political order, a brave new leadership, and a brave new India. This, even as it was equated with patriotism of a stale stereotype.

An equally, if not even more, unarmed part of the argument was that Pokharan represented a triumph of Indian science. Official claims in this regard – of the government in general and specifically its science establishment – were unquestioningly accepted and enthusiastically endorsed, and as soon as they were publicised, by a media that has specially prided

itself on its scepticism and even cynicism. It remained eloquently silent, by and large, over an important scientific aspect of the issue – the mass-destructive character of a nuclear weapon in its diabolical dimensions that make it a concern of not pure pacifists alone. The claimed success of Indian science was equated, above all, with a nationalism that was no different from nuclear militarism.

The claim of a pro-Bomb consensus traced it back to Pokharan I of Indira Gandhi’s seventies. The much-vaunted `bold departure’ was claimed to have been made, however, from an older, Nehruvian foreign policy consensus. As for the departure from India’s position hitherto on the nuclear issue in the international arena, it was hailed as an abandonment of hypocrisy, ambiguity, etc. It was a no-nonsense nationalism, of which the blasts were supposed to have given the world a notice.

The theme was enlarged and embellished by dwelling on the departure in respect to one particular detail: India vis-a-vis the Third World. Of the many strands woven into the pro-Pokharan fabric, none testified more to skill of a cynical kind. It was a two-phased tactic: First, damn the Third World; second, damn the anti-nuclear-weapon campaign by identifying it with the Third World. Opponents of Pokharan thus became pleaders for perpetuating India’s place among the wretched of the earth writhing under despots and its membership of the club of the world’s poor.

Conversely, Pokharan was projected as a passport to a higher world status. It spelt something like an upward national mobility. Join the nuclear club, and you will jump straight out of the Third World – that was the mantra of this media. Never mind about the state of the nation’s economy, especially the majority of its people. And, who cared about the fate of the erstwhile fraternity of the destitute, with whom we ceased to have anything in common that historic moment of last May?

Similar was the strand of the argument related to the Left. Here, too, it was a two-step tactic: Damn the Left, first, for double standards on the issue; and, then, damn the anti-nuclear-weapon campaign by identifying it with the Left and the Left alone. What about the Chinese bomb, how about the Soviet bomb, they would chortle, and the prosecution rested the case as though the opponents of Pokharan did not include those of nuclear weaponisation elsewhere and everywhere.

The media was divided on the next step of nuclear diplomacy. A section was, loudly and clearly, for India signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty unconditionally to press and preserve the advantage gained with Pokharan; another was for conditional signing of the CTBT; and a third was undecided about how to justify an abrupt about-turn on the treaty, considering that the political camp of Pokharan, too, had till recently opposed it as discriminatory. But, all of them were agreed on one point (or one and a half points!): that the blasts and the emergence of India as a nuclear-weapon state somehow bettered the prospect of global nuclear disarmament (and that the CTBT would not stall its further development as such a state).

It is not as if even individual members of this media spoke in one voice. Each one of them, in fact, allowed space for other opinions, but little doubt was left that these represented the `other’ viewpoint. The apparently liberal indulgence of dissent made the main argument more acceptable and thus added to legitimisation of Pokharan.

This broad review is based on a representative sample of such opinion in this section of the media – Indian Express (mainly) and The Pioneer among daily newspapers and India Today among the periodicals. Following are illustrations, which speak for themselves and will need comment only to reinforce the above points about a specially influential media response.

Indian Express of May 12, the morrow of Pokharan, greeted its readers with a frontpage editorial, signed by Chief Editor Shekhar Gupta, headlined `Road to Resurgence’. Outlining the argument to be pursued in the coming days, it opened with an unequivocal accolade:

"The triple test at Pokharan ends three decades of nuclear debate, self-denial and fence-sitting. Several times in recent years Indian leadership – irrespective of party affiliation in an era of shifting coalitions – came close to taking the plunge. It is just as well that this momentous step has been taken by leaders who have always believed in unabashed and unambiguous nuclearisation. More reassuring, even for those who have been arguing for restraint and ambiguity, is the fact that these leaders also enjoy an impeccable reputation in terms of personal integrity and national commitment. It is, therefore, reasonable to presume that they have chosen to make so bold a departure from the past after a great deal of deliberation as to what is best for India’s interests. The scientific wherewithal has been there for several years now. The only thing that lacked was the trigger device of political will and the kind of supreme confidence that enables leaders to move away from the familiar, well-trodden path and thereby find themselves a place in history."

Clearly recognisable are quite a few of the ingredients of the recipe of nuclear weaponisation offered as the media response to Pokharan. More than lightly touched upon was the theme of a tacit consensus as also of the bold departure. Not only the bravery of the new leadership but the other qualities it was believed to possess were presented as an incontestable line of argument. Asserted was the no-frill character of a pro-Pokharan nationalism that was no admirer of `ambiguity’ and no respecter of restraint.

The editorial pursued the theme by recalling and ridiculing the claim made after Pokharan I that it was a `peaceful nuclear explosion’. "The world saw it, by and large, as an expression of weakness – and hypocrisy." With apparently unconscious irony, it added: "India is prepared with a diplomatic wet blanket to contain the fallout by offering to be a willing and active player in the international nuclear arms control regime. The difference now

is that India seeks to play the game as a nuclear weapon power. This is the end of ambiguity and hypocrisy." The postulate here was India’s post-Pokharan preparedness to sign the CTBT. The exercise was not intended as "an end of ambiguity and hypocrisy", as we shall see.

Followed the `scientific-triumph’ strand, with a special bravo for a bureaucracy’s supposed success in keeping an official secret: "This is a time for popular euphoria and celebration. And celebrate we must as this success demonstrates to the world a remarkable scientific capability built during a quarter century of international technology transfer restrictions. It is also a cause for reassurance that even in these cynical times when we tend to believe so easily that any fellow-Indian’s loyalties are purchaseable for a few dollars, a scholarship or a green card the establishment has managed to keep such a major move a secret despite the snooping that extends from the Capital’s cocktail circuit to outer space." (Whether the US non-detection of the tests, so alluded to, was due to the alleged negligibility of the yield or any other factor was a matter that the media did not choose to investigate.)

The editorial added: "But this is also a time for reflecting where we go from here….Pokharan II is like a jump start to India’s dormant, frozen spirit. But, it won’t, by itself, be a short-cut to the place India wishes, and desires to have on the international stage. It is now up to Vajpayee and Advani to moderate the euphoria, contain the diplomatic fallout and exploit

the advantage they have given themselves, and India by creating this new mood of resurgence." With certain other steps, it was implied, Pokharan would indeed be a short-cut to a higher world status for the country.

In the same issue, on the editorial page, was carried a regular editorial as well on the event, under a double-decker headline: "End of uncertainty Now the world must react realistically to Pokharan." It started by reiterating that Pokharan represented at once a consensus and a radical break: "….Twentyfour years ago, it (India) had shown a similar resolve with the first tests of a fission device. No Indian is complaining now – no institutional voice can be heard, at least. It was the same story in Indira Gandhi’s day. No wing of ruling power structure, from the legislatures to the corporate sector, voiced serious objections to the test. In the intervening years, there has been a wide-ranging debate in legislatures, talk-shops and the media, and an unequivocal, institutional consensus has emerged. The government has merely used this consensus to initiate a change in policy direction, to break with traditional patterns of thought which were created by the ghost of Congress past." The conclusion about no Indian complaint was reached within twelve hours of the tests.

The editorial then warmed to what was to become a favourite theme with the entire pro-Pokharan fraternity of these high echelons – the tests as something that finally set India apart from the Third World identified in turn with some widely unloved members: "…the tests should not be seen as the expression of a single despot’s will…(like)…the belligerent initiatives of Libya and Iraq. Neither can it be dealt with by an air-strike on a presidential palace." This was addressed, evidently, to the West.

Interestingly, the editorial added: "…The immediate objective of the tests is obvious: daring Pakistan to show whether it has comparable capability and end the uncertainty of the last few weeks. But, the long-term objective is to tell the world that the time for unqualified restraint is over. India is no longer satisfied with its subaltern role of being a lonely, unsung campaigner against the CTBT…" Pakistan was to answer the question soon, and the paper to take up a campaign for the CTBT.

It did so the very next day. In an article under the double-decker headline "Burdens of the nuclear state The morning after" in his column National Interest, Shekhar Gupta insisted: "The signals that go out from India now need to reflect the mind of a mature, self-assured and powerful nation and not the reaction of a defensive, jingoistic and shaky establishment." The reaction, that is, to the idea of signing the CTBT. The column wanted a break with the national consensus hitherto on this issue. Unconscious irony made its appearance again in the subsequent observation: "The applause for the induction (in Sri Lanka) of the IPKF (Indian Peace-Keeping Force), to begin with, was unanimous and chorus-like, as has by now become the norm when it comes to national security issues."

With the column urging a departure from the beaten track, the opportunity for Third World-bashing of a specific style was not allowed to go unused: "The world by and large is not pleased with us. Today, there isn’t even the old Third World lobby of drum-beaters unless a Castro, Gaddafi or Saddam decides to embarrass us by rising in our support." (Nelson Mandela did not exactly rise in India’s support at the latest non-aligned summit, but that did appear to distinctly embarrass the government and its leadership.)

The editorial of the day was even more explicit. Its headline urged: "Seize the day Forget national ego, move on to CTBT". Only a day after the event, the paper said: "Now that the self-congratulatory euphoria occasioned by the nuclear tests has begun to fade, the government must immediately get down to the job of dealing with the fallout." The editorial euphoria, however, lingered on: "…the tests have raised India to a new level where it can look upon these nations (of the West) as its peers, and so see that its point of view gets a decent hearing."

Noting that the government had "announced its willingness to subscribe to certain elements of the treaty", the editorial said: "So far, no signatory has chosen to treat the CTBT as a negotiable instrument….India should follow the example set by China and France and sign unconditionally." Reason? "The test explosions have given it (India) a database that should preclude the need for further testing, except in computer simulations." The claim was to become a key element of the argument.

Two further tests took place on May 13. The editorial of May 14 said: "It seems almost certain that the government wants to go ahead and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – when it is good and ready. That is, after completing its test programme, which it says now is the case…"

An editorial on May 19 was devoted to the theme of `scientific triumph’ alone. It deserves to be quoted at length for its unquestioning acceptance of official claims and for its equation of nuclear science with nuclear militarism. Under the headline "Scientific breakthrough In complete nuclear weaponisation", it said: "Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam’s statement that "nuclear weaponisation is complete" is supported by the other assertions made by him and his colleagues at a Press conference….There can be no doubt…that India’s scientists have the capability to produce (the) hydrogen bomb with destructive forces several fold higher than the fission bomb which laid Hiroshima and Nagasaki waste.

"…the Prithvi and Agni missiles can be armed with nuclear warheads….critical data have been obtained to enable the scientists to continue working on refining various types and sizes of nuclear weapons in the laboratory and on computers.

"…India’s nuclear chiefs chose on one of their rare days in the sun to reassure the world that the fearsome power at their fingertips is intended only to secure India from threat, not to threaten anyone.

"Dr Kalam…said the command and control system was being given a new direction…In furtherance of this, the Defence Ministry took charge over the weekend of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and the Defence Research and Development Organisation of another key nuclear research and development establishment…"

There was a return to the `Third World’ theme on May 27. The article in the National Interest column of the day, headlined "Self-pity of the nuclear state Stop eating enriched grass", warned against the folly of seeking support in these quarters. Upward national mobility was stated as the objective of the tests: "…only to an inferiorly complexed mind steeped in Nehruvian hypocrisy would a Third World bomb sound like a sexy new idea. Poor nations acquire nukes to find a short-cut out of the Third World. At least that’s what we have been told over the decades by the pro-bomb lobby. Here we want to use ours to confirm our status as the leader of the world’s wretched."

On May 28, Pakistan responded with its own nuclear tests in the Chagai range. The paper’s was a subdued response. "If May 11 was the test of India’s will," it said in the next day’s editorial, "this is now a test of its wisdom". The event did not affect the argument significantly: especially since the official claim was accepted that the Pakistani tests were a less complete series than India’s.

The position on the CTBT was modified as days passed, with the government showing no readiness to sign it immediately and unconditionally. The headline of an editorial of July 7 said it: "Get subtle Don’t use a sledgehammer on the CTBT". Followed a rephrasing of the position, with its own kind of ambiguity and, yes, hypocrisy: "As far as accepting treaty constraints on testing are concerned, there need be no hesitation on technical grounds. Scientists from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defence Research and Development Organisation have said they are confident about the results of the five tests in May and the option now available of sub-critical and computer testing which the CTBT permits. Some experts like Arundhati Ghosh, India’s former chief negotiator at Geneva, have expressed qualms about the CTBT verification process. That should be re-examined for possible problems. Politically, it is a more complex matter. The government is going to have to work hard at carrying public opinion along with it. Most people have been led to believe that the treaty is discriminatory and flawed. The government will have to explain why the discriminatory aspects no longer hold after India acquired the capabilities of nuclear powers." Arundhati Ghosh’s objection to the continuing discriminatory character of the treaty against countries that remain non-nuclear was ignored.

The fact, actually, did not matter, according to the argument. This was made clear again in an article headlined "India’s dilemma: CTBT vs ignorance" by Manvendra Singh in a column named Strategic Stance. The article carried the `Third World’-bashing to a new level of crudity: "…why should the country continue to cry itself hoarse that the CTBT is discriminatory? The treaty certainly does not enable, say Togo, to conduct nuclear experiments, so in that sense it does discriminate against that paragon of non-alignment. But then Togo has not conducted nuclear experiments, and so it does not have the wherewithal to continue the testing programme using supercomputers and micro-nukes. Is that something with which India should be exercised to an order so as to label probably the most comprehensive international nuclear arrangement as discriminatory?…On this score, India has always been isolated by this delightful club of the destitute." It is only a climber of a country that can affect such contempt for, and a suddenly higher status than, its economic peers just because it has made a bomb.

But, one had to wait till August 24 (after the first post-Pokharan Hiroshima anniversary) for the most unashamed statement of the argument in all its mind-boggling mindlessness. Under the headline "Left out of history Think of national interest", the day’s main editorial declaimed: "See what has happened? The tears of the golden jubilee celebrations (sic) of Nagasaki have not yet dried on third-world cheeks. And the children of Baghdad have not yet got their third meal or vitamin C tablets, despite good brother Saddam’s best humanitarian efforts. Not to speak of the proletarian struggle of the beloved comrades of Havana and Pyongyang. Now see, he has struck again – the imperialist. So impeach him – right now. Professional third-worldists and rusted anti-imperialists are out in the marketplace of dead ideas, wailing over the American aerial atrocities against humanity….they are not talking about Osama Bin Laden, who is, after all, a defender of faith and a campaigner against white horror. Their subject of complaint is the American President, who, symbolically, is a living negation of everything that is third-worldist or moral…"

The editorial went on to deliver the coup de grace: "The imperialist knows quite a deal about national interest. The anti-imperialist (or the third-worldist) lives in a space outside history – or the nation. Even Nelson Mandela – yes, the Mandela of every third-worldist – has not subordinated his national interest to the rhetoric of struggle and liberation. But there are quite a few Indians who continue to live in the fairytale world of imperialist evil and third-world idealism. That is what happens when fossilised minds confront the new world where every war, every bomb, is an assertion of national interest. India has suffered the burden of borrowed jargons for long. When India wakes up, only dead minds protest."

It is difficult to decide which is more remarkable: the way contempt for the world’s poor (and Hiroshima’s victims) is combined with communalism and a soft corner for Bill Clinton (along with a special pleading for the USA), or the way bombs, wars and conflicts of national interests are projected as signs of a brave new world.

On to The Pioneer, for a more cursory review (so as not to cover the same ground all over again). The immediate response of the paper was essentially the same, though expressed in more euphoric terms. The headline of the frontpage editorial of May 12, signed by Editor Chandan Mitra, said it all: "Explosion of self-esteem".

On the CTBT, the paper took a less categorical line, in recognition of the problem of reconciling India’s signing of the treaty to the country’s past position on it in international fora.

The editorial page has, since the tests, played host to a variety of views on the issue, but the balance of opinion expressed has without doubt been in favour of the Bomb. And, the expression hardly suffered from any excessive restraint. Below are just a couple of the more quotable verbal missiles aimed at the anti-nuclear-weapon camp in these columns.

From an article headlined "Full steam ahead, damn the torpedoes" by M.N. Buch (June 3): "Unfortunately, we have a number of anti-national do-gooders who have decried the fact that India is now in a position to defend itself. Their constant refrain is that instead of building bombs we should build schools. I was recently in Lucknow where I had the opportunity of observing that icon and messiah of Dalits, Ms Mayawati. Rupees 10 crore have been wasted on a granite pillar in Parivartan Chowk. In Ambedkar Nagar, Rs 25 crore have been spent on a VIP guest house, Rs 200 crore on the building of a training centre for scheduled caste candidates for civil services (faculty and educational aids are missing), approximately Rs 250 crore will be spent on a statue of Dr Ambedkar….Neither Kuldip Nayar, nor Praful Bidwai nor Medha Patkar (has) ever questioned the wastage of money…The cacophony almost convinces one that these people would be quite happy to see India destroyed in a war by Pakistan. What breed of Indians are these?"

Only someone with no idea at all of the cost of nuclear weaponisation could compare it with the instances of "wastage" mentioned. It must be added that this section of the elite media did not make any effort either to calculate the cost. The question was ignored as though it were inconsequential.

Popular periodicals in general rely more on reports to make their point. India Today, in its special issue of May 25, recorded the moment in rapturous terms:

"For the six men who assembled in the sitting room of the prime minister’s official residence at Race Course Road that hot Monday afternoon, it was a tense wait. As three simultaneous nuclear explosions rocked the scorching sands of the Pokharan test range in the Rajasthan desert at 3.45 p.m., the only sound they heard was the purring of an air-conditioner. The prime minister’s principal secretary Brajesh Mishra lifted the receiver hesitantly to hear an excited voice cry "Done!"

"Putting the caller on hold, Mishra re-entered the room. Seeing his expression, Prime Minister Vajpayee, Home Minister L.K. Advani, Defence Minister George Fernandes, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha and Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Jaswant Singh could barely control their feelings. Advani was seen wiping away his tears. Picking up the receiver, Vajpayee, in an emotion-choked voice, thanked the two scientists – who made it happen – Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) chief R. Chidambaram and head of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), Abdul Kalam."

There were no dry eyes among the readers, one is tempted to add.

The June 1 issue (with the cover story on Hawkish India and a tricolour hawk on the cover) dealt with the hard-headed nationalism that Pokharan was supposed to have given notice of.

From the Editor-in-Chief, a regular letter to the readers from Aroon Purie, said: "Lord Palmerstone. A former British prime minister and a noted nationalist, once said: "A country does not have permanent friends, only permanent interests." It is a philosophy India’s BJP-led Government would undoubtedly approve of. Last fortnight’s nuclear tests may not have won it too many friends abroad. An unruffled Government, however, is convinced it is acting in the national interest."

It added: "For decades, India’s foreign policy was based on conciliation. The nuclear test have radically altered that. With India adopting an aggressive posture. The message is obvious: a nation ignored must now be noticed…"

The cover story said: "The Pokharan tests have radically redefined India’s foreign policy. It is now seen as a nation pursuing its interests aggressively, discarding its self-righteous halo."

A report on the Prime Minister’s visit to the Pokharan site declared: "For once, his eloquence wasn’t called for. Braving the desert heat…Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee stood at the edge of the crater caused by India’s recent nuclear blasts in Pokharan and simply flashed the`V’ sign. That was vocal enough. In the world of diplomacy, Henry Kissinger observes, a loaded gun is more potent than a legal brief. Or, even speech."

Interesting light was thrown, in the same issue, on how the media was won by (Editor) Prabhu Chawla. In an article headlined "Vajpayee’s blitzkrieg Spin doctors work overtime to give the PM a facelift", in his column Race Course Road. Chawla said: "…the sudden avalanche of press briefings and selective leaks last week by mandarins of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) have jaded even the ever-hungry journalistic palate. Rarely in recent times have scribes covering the PMO and the Ministry of External Affairs been wined and dined in the manner that the movers and shakers of the BJP-led coalition have been doing. The sumptuous meals were accompanied by an overdose of India’s nuclear case….The hidden agenda behind this excessive interaction with the fourth estate: to change Atal Behari Vajpayee’s image from that of an indecisive prime minister to an assertive chief executive…."

The column talked of a committed PMO and a Clinton-style media management: "Vajpayee has drafted a highly motivated group to project him and protect the Government…so you have a Rose Garden-style press meet venue on the lush lawns at 7 Race Course Road, complete with a teak rostrum, behind which the tricolour is artfully draped. For the first time, the prime minister has put together a team which comprises people with ideological commitment to the ruling party…"

With good results, concluded the article. "If excessive media blitzkrieg was aimed at neutralising an orchestrated anti-Government sentiment, the crack PMO team did deliver handsomely. Within a week, most of Indian newspapers and fringe armchair intellectuals were bending over backwards in joining the jingoistic chorus."

And, jingoism finds as odious an illustration as any in (Deputy Editor) Swapan Dasgupta’s column The Usual Suspects in the same issue. The article under the headline "The Steeling of India Celebrations over, time to win the psychological war" projects the opponents of Pokharan as quislings collaborating with the nation’s external enemies.

"…For the avant-garde minusculity," the article said, "this is the high noon of contrariness. It is an "obscenity", decries academic Shiv Visvanathan on the Internet, "the new Indian self violates…my emotion of being Indian". The N-tests have "lowered India’s global stature and (are) likely to cause the people serious economic hardship", activist Praful Bidwai informs Pakistani readers of Dawn…"

The Pokharan patriotism could not quietly let such things pass. The article added: "…The BJP machinery is formidable, but its leverage over the centres of intellectual power in the country is nominal. The state-funded, left-leaning edifice created by Indira Gandhi in the early ‘70s is disoriented, but firmly intact. Now, bereft of Marxist sustenance, it is shifting its gaze (to the USA)…the escalating campaign to denigrate India’s nuclear achievement is, for example, strongly networked to US think-tanks and institutes. The clout of the comprador intelligentsia could have been glossed over if India had no overpowering ambition to be counted on the world stage. Today’s agenda calls for the active nurturing of a new intelligentsia committed to the post-nuclear resurgence."

The column could not have kept silent over the observance of the Hiroshima Day on August 6 with an anti-Pokharan thrust in India. Under the headline "Basu’s Red Republic Does India have any jurisdiction over West Bengal?" (dealing with different issues altogether), it treated the occasion as one of importance to the Left alone:

"When a US Air Force plane nuked Hiroshima…Josef Stalin was both angry and jubilant. Angry because he didn’t have the latest weapon of mass destruction and jubilant because the devastation gave him the opportunity to grab some of imperial Japan’s territory. This, of course, is history, a history that the lost intelligentsia, now dancing attendance to India’s left, is anxious to gloss over. Selective indignation and spurious moralising were, after all, at the heart of last week’s Hiroshima Day that so enthralled the editors of Star News."

To sum up. This section of the media sought to sell Pokharan as a package of special appeal to its specific audience. It did so by claiming the tests to be based on a national consensus as well as a break with the past. It did so in the name of Indian science and nationalism of a new, ruthless realpolitik. It did so by presenting Pokharan as a passport to an elevated world status for India. It did so by ignoring the economic implications of nuclear weaponisation almost in their entirety. It sought to damn the anti-Pokharan camp by identifying it with Leftism and `Third-Worldism’ and damning both.

To repeat a point already made, the above is only a broad review based on a roughly representative sample. Readers are most welcome to bring to our notice aspects of the subject that may have been missed here.